

CONFIDENTIAL

EE  
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JUL - 6 1954

Chief, [redacted]  
[redacted]  
Chief of Mission, Frankfurt

INFO: E3

Intelligence

Discussion with Gustav Hilger

MICROFILMED

MAR 13 1963

DOC MICROSER

1. Attached herewith is a short summary of conversation covering a discussion held on 12 June 1954 between [redacted] and the undersigned with Gustav Hilger.

[redacted] will be meeting Hilger again, and I hope to see him again also, and he would be pleased to forward me anything you may have in the way of questions or comments.

SECRET/NOFORN	
1. Summary of Conversation with Gustav Hilger (2 copies)	
2. [redacted]	
3. [redacted]	
4. [redacted]	
5. [redacted]	
6. [redacted]	
7. [redacted]	
8. [redacted]	
9. [redacted]	
10. [redacted]	

DECLASSIFIED	
1. [redacted]	
2. [redacted]	
3. [redacted]	
4. [redacted]	
5. [redacted]	
6. [redacted]	
7. [redacted]	
8. [redacted]	
9. [redacted]	
10. [redacted]	

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

EE2 RECT

5/c 10 JUN 54 4453

LATTER

29 June 54

Memorandum of Conversation with

LATTER

, recently named as a leading Eastern Affairs expert in the West German Foreign Office, reiterated, in an informal conversation on 15 June 1954, his basic belief that the Federal Republic must remain tied firmly to the West, and that any neutralist policy is impossible. He gave no indication that he has changed his views expressed in his book, "The Incompatible Allies", in which he says that in the present situation where the USSR has swallowed up buffer states and part of Germany itself, "the possibilities open to Germany at the time of Rapallo have disappeared, and only two alternatives are open to her. She can either seek security against the Soviet threat by alliance with the Western powers, or else she can ally herself with the Soviet Union. But in the event of the latter, West Germany, and probably the rest of Europe, would doubtless share the fate of the East European satellites". He stressed repeatedly the theme that, in the years following World War I, the alliance between Germany and the USSR was one of the blind and the lame, of two powers of relatively equal strength; and that such a power relationship, one of two powers of approximately equal strength or weakness, was a precondition for today's relations with the USSR.

While ruling out a strong alliance now between the two powers, and endorsing firm ties with the West as West Germany's only possible course of action, he did not eliminate the possibility of some increasing ties with the East. He felt that it was natural for West German business interests to press for more business in the Soviet orbit ("look at what

[ ]

business England is carrying on"), but also emphasized that the Soviet orbit was not in a good position to supply goods in return.

He pointed out that he had talked to Pflaiderer (who had worked under him in the German Embassy in Moscow) after the recent Pflaiderer statements on ties with the East. He said that Pflaiderer had had no idea how much reaction there would be to his plan to increase ties with Moscow, and was considerably embarrassed by the excitement caused by his suggestions. <sup>LATTER</sup> said he told Pflaiderer recently that while he (Pflaiderer) knew the USSR from personal experience and would not be deceived by many favorable outward appearances (by "Potemkin villages"), other German Bundestag deputies or other visitors to the USSR might very well be taken in.

<sup>LATTER</sup> also stressed that Adenauer was so thoroughly Western oriented personally that he himself showed little interest in the work or activities of the Eastern Affairs section of the Foreign Office. <sup>LATTER</sup> stressed that the Eastern Affairs section was trying to build up new blood ("Nachwuchs"), and in this connection mentioned the name of one individual, Boris Meissner, as outstanding.